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Abstract
We present a general framework of evolutionary dynamics under persistent heterogeneity
in payoff functions and revision protocols, allowing continuously many types in a game with
finitely many strategies. The dynamic is rigorously formulated as a differential equation of a
joint probability measure of types and strategies. To establish a foundation of this framework,
we clarify regularity assumptions on the revision protocol, the game and the type distribution
to guarantee the existence of a unique solution trajectory as well as those to guarantee the
existence of equilibrium in a heterogeneous population game. We further verify equilibrium
stationarity in general and stability in potential games under admissible dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics formulate off-equilibrium adjustment processes of agents’ choices in games,
allowing various decision rules (revision protocols) such as exact optimization, better reply based
on pairwise comparison of payoffs, imitation, etc. Despite a wide range of applications to social
and economic problems and also a potential role to challenge a conventional equilibrium-based
approach, evolutionary dynamics have not fully captured one common staple of economic/agent-
based models, i.e., heterogeneity of agents. It is a common practice in applied or empirical stud-
ies to assume continuous types of agents—especially, in many of applied economic models (e.g.
auctions, aggregate demand1), in econometric estimation of discrete choice models (e.g. logit re-
gression) and in theoretical investigations of game experiments (quantal response equilibria). To
embed heterogeneity to evolutionary dynamics, we typically assume that there are only finitely
many types so they can be formulated as distinct populations (or genes); it requires some tech-
nical twists for discrete approximation of a continuous type space and also leaves non-negligible
impacts of each individual type on others.2
There are a few studies that deal with a continuous range of payoff heterogeneity in evolution-
ary dynamics. But, these studies rely on aggregability of the dynamic—the change in the aggregate
strategy distribution is wholly determined from the current state of the aggregate distribution
alone, independently of the underlying correlation between strategy choices and payoff types.3
Such aggregability may be assumed as in Blonski (1999) or may be derived from some specific
form of the agents’ strategy revision processes as in Ely and Sandholm (2005). This is a demand-
ing restriction for games and dynamics; heterogeneous choices of agents cannot have an impact
on payoffs or on dynamics through something beyond their average, for example through the
variance or distribution of strategies over different types. It is virtually the same as having just one
“representative/average” type of agents. This cannot capture impacts of the correlation between
persistent heterogeneity (or “fixed effects” in discrete choice regression) and changes in choices.
In this paper, we provide a general framework to extend evolutionary dynamics to hetero-
geneous population games without requiring aggregability or restricting to a finite type space.
We allow agents not only to have different payoff functions but also to follow different decision
rules. To allow continuously many types in our framework, we need to tackle on technicality on
1Dynamic demand of myopic consumers is considered in the literature on dynamic monopoly pricing: Rohlfs
(1974); Dhebar and Oren (1985, 1986) are seminar papers. They assume a continuous type distribution to define a con-
tinuous dynamic of the aggregate demand, though they implicitly assume aggregability. Employing the aggregability
result in Ely and Sandholm (2005), Zusai (2015) justifies the aggregate demand dynamic as an aggregate obtaiend from
the standard best response dynamic.
2For example, Lahkar (2017) considers logit dynamics in a potential game on a continuous strategy space with
finitely many payoff types.
3 Hummel and McAfee (2018) apply (a generalized version of) replicator dynamics to formulate the demand dy-
namic in the monopoly pricing problem, as argued in footnote 1. While the replicator dynamic is not aggregable as
argued in Zusai (2017), they obtain an explicit solution for the differential equation that represent the demand dy-
namic, thanks to their specification of functions (especially in their Lemma 1). Since the demand dynamic is only a part
of the monopolist’s dynamic optimization, equilibrium stationarity or stability is not discussed in their paper. (Actually,
terms like ‘equilibrium’ or ’stability’ appears only in the bibliography in the paper.)
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dimensionality. The state of an evolutionary dynamic is the strategy distribution over different
types; the dimension of the dynamic is just as large as the number of types. Without averaging off
heterogeneity or assuming a finite type space, we need to deal with a dynamic system on infinite
dimension. Therefore, we start from carefully defining evolutionary dynamics with a measure
theoretic formulation of the state space, borrowed from the literature on evolution in games with
continuously many strategies, especially Oechssler and Riedel (2001, 2002) and Cheung (2014).4
Even the unique existence of a solution trajectory cannot be simply granted for infinite di-
mensional dynamics. We clarify the regularity conditions on games and individual decision rules
to assure it. If individual agents respond continuously to changes in payoffs (L-continuous re-
vision protocols in Definition 1), the dynamic has a unique solution trajectory from an arbitrary
initial state in the heterogeneous setting, requiring only the uniform boundedness of switching
rates over all types (Assumption 2). If an agent takes only the exact optimal strategy (exact op-
timization protocols in Definition 2) just as in the best response dynamic, the individual revision
protocol exhibits discontinuity when the transition of the strategy distribution triggers a switch
of the agent’s optimal strategy through changes in payoffs. To mitigate discontinuity at the indi-
vidual level, we impose a kind of Lipschitz continuity on the distribution of the types whose best
response strategies change with such a transition (Assumption 3).
We then confirm that standard properties of evolutionary dynamics can be extended from the
homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous setting. First, if the individual decision rule assures
stationarity of Nash equilibrium in the homogeneous setting, it also assures equilibrium stability
in heterogeneous population games (Theorem 2). We also obtain the condition for the existence
of an equilibrium (Theorem 3). Combining them, we can guarantee existence of a stationary state
in heterogeneous evolutionary dynamics. While stability of equilibrium is not granted generally
even in a homogeneous population game, it is known that potential games maintain equilibrium
stability over a wide range of homogeneous evolutionary dynamics. With a rigorous formulation
of heterogeneous potential games (Definition 5), we verify that equilibrium stability is extended
to the heterogeneous setting (Theorem 5). In particular, a local maximum of the potential function
is locally stable under any admissible dynamics, and also vice versa if the maximum is isolated
(Corollary 3).
In the next section, we define a heterogeneous population game and then build a heteroge-
neous evolutionary dynamic from an individual agent’s revision protocol. Next we present our
main results. In Section 3, we study the regularity conditions to guarantee the existence of a unique
solution path. In Section 4, we extend equilibrium stationarity in general and equilibrium stability
of potential games to the heterogeneous setting. Until this section, we consider heterogeneity only
in payoff functions and focus on non-observational evolutionary dynamics, in which an agent’s
switching rate depends only on the payoff vector for the agent but not on other agents’ strategies.
In Section 5, we consider heterogeneity in revision protocols and observational dynamics such as
4To name a few more, see also Hofbauer, Oechssler, and Riedel (2009), Friedman and Ostrov (2013), Lahkar and
Seymour (2013), Lahkar and Riedel (2015) and Cheung (2016).
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imitative dynamics and excess payoff comparison dynamics; we confirm that the theorems in this
paper are robust to these extensions. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with a summary of the
positive results in this paper and discussion on their implications and limitations. Appendices
provide the proofs and a few technical details on the measure-theoretic construction of heteroge-
neous dynamics. Parts of proofs that essentially involve only heavy calculation are found in the
Supplementary Note.
2 The base model
2.1 Heterogeneous population games
We first set up the game played in a heterogeneous population; here we quickly introduce essen-
tial components for our analysis, while we provide a complete measure-theoretic formulation in
Appendix A.1.
Consider a continuous population of agents, each of whom chooses a strategy from the same
strategy set S = {1, · · · , S}. Each agent is assigned to type θ ∈ Θ. Assume that type space Θ is
a complete separable space with metric dΘ : Θ2 → R+.5 Types may represent heterogeneity in
assessments of payoffs (possibly due to private information) as we focus in this base model, or
heterogeneity in revision protocols as we discuss in Section 5, or both. If there are only finitely
many types, these “types” could be formulated as different populations (or species in a biological
context) in a conventional approach; however, we may have continuously many types in our
model. Let BΘ the set of Borel sets over Θ, and PΘ be the distribution of types: for any Borel set
BΘ ∈ BΘ of types, PΘ(BΘ) is the mass of agents whose types belong to BΘ.
The population state is described by the (joint) strategy distribution X = (Xs)s∈S , a joint
distribution of strategies and types such that the marginal distribution of types coincides with
PΘ. For each strategy s ∈ S and each Borel set BΘ ∈ BΘ of types, Xs(BΘ) is a mass of strategy-s
players whose types belong to BΘ. For each BΘ, the strategy distribution X = (Xs)s∈S must satisfy
∑s∈S Xs(BΘ) = PΘ(BΘ). Denote by X the space of joint strategy distributions.
Since X satisfies Xs(BΘ) ≤ PΘ(BΘ) for each s ∈ S , each Xs is absolutely continuous with
respect to PΘ; see (A.1) in Appendix A.1. We denote this relationship of the absolute continuity
by PΘ  X. By Radon-Nikodym theorem, the absolute continuity guarantees the existence of a
density function xs : Θ → R+ of Xs such that Xs(BΘ) =
∫
BΘ
xsdPΘ. Then, (type-)conditional
strategy distribution x = (xs)s∈S is defined by collecting the density functions xs over all s ∈
S ;6 we abbreviate the relationship between X and its density x as X = ∫ xdPΘ. Notice x(θ) ∈
∆S := {z ∈ RS+ : ∑s∈S zs = 1} for each type θ ∈ Θ.7 xs(θ) ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as the
5In Examples 1– 3, Θ is (possibly, a subset of) a finite-dimensional real space such asR orRS. Then, we can take an
Euclidean norm, for example, to define metric dΘ.
6In an incomplete information game with finite players, X is essentially a distributional strategy and x is a behav-
ioral strategy in Milgrom and Weber (1985). Ely and Sandholm (2005) call x a Bayesian strategy.
7We denote R+ = [0,+∞) and R++ = (0,+∞). Consider a |U |-dimensional real space, each of whose coordinate
is labeled with one element of U = {1, . . . , |U |}. For set S ⊂ U , we define an |S|-dimensional simplex ∆|U |(S) as
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population share of strategy-s players in the subpopulation of type-θ agents. Denote by FX the
set of type-conditional strategy distributions.8 Type-conditional strategy distribution x is (PΘ-
almost) uniquely determined from joint strategy distribution X by Radon-Nikodym theorem, and
vice versa. So, X is equivalent to FX .
Let Fs[X](θ) be a type θ-agent’s payoff from strategy s when the strategy distribution is X.
Thus, F[X](θ) = (Fs[X](θ))s∈S ∈ RS is the payoff vector for type θ given strategy distribution X.
Given X, F[X] : Θ → RS specifies the payoff vector F[X](θ) for each type θ ∈ Θ; thus we call
F[X] the payoff vector profile. We assume that F[X] belongs to CΘ, the set of continuous functions
from Θ to RS. Payoff function F : X → CΘ maps a strategy distribution X ∈ X to a payoff vector
profile F[X] ∈ CΘ. A heterogeneous population game is defined by (S , (Θ,BΘ,PΘ), F), which we
represent by F.
Let SBR(pi0) ⊂ S be the set of optimal strategies given payoff vector pi0 = (pi0s )s∈S ∈ RS:
i.e., SBR(pi0) := argmaxs∈S pi0s . Denote by ∆(SBR(pi0)) the set of strategy distributions that assign
positive probabilities only to the optimal strategies given pi0: i.e., ∆(SBR(pi0)) = {y ∈ ∆S : ys >
0 ⇒ a ∈ SBR(pi0)}.
In heterogeneous population game F, SFBR[X](θ) := SBR(F[X](θ)) collects the optimal strategies
given payoff vector F[X](θ) for type θ; namely, it is the set of type-θ’s best response strategies to
X in game F. Let ΘFs∈BR[X] be the set of types for which strategy s is a best response to X, and
ΘFs=uniqBR[X] the set of types for which strategy s is the unique best response to X: i.e.,
ΘFs∈BR[X] := {θ ∈ Θ : s ∈ SFBR[X](θ)} ⊃ ΘFs=uniqBR[X] :=
{
θ ∈ Θ : {s} = SFBR[X](θ)
}
.
In a Nash equilibrium, (almost) every agent correctly predicts strategy distribution X and takes
the best response to it. Correspondingly, strategy distribution X ∈ X is an equilibrium strategy
distribution in game F, if
PΘ(ΘFs=uniqBR[X] ∩ BΘ) ≤ Xs(BΘ) ≤ PΘ(ΘFs∈BR[X] ∩ BΘ) for all s ∈ S and BΘ ∈ BΘ. (1)
Among types in BΘ, all those who have s as the unique best response must choose this strategy s in
equilibrium; thus Xs(BΘ) must be at least PΘ(ΘFs=uniqBR[X] ∩ BΘ). On the other hand, those who
have s as one of the best responses may or may not add to strategy-s players and thus Xs(BΘ) is at
most PΘ(ΘFs∈BR[X] ∩ BΘ). In terms of conditional strategy distribution x such that X =
∫
xdPΘ,
(1) is equivalent to
x(θ) ∈ ∆(SFBR[X](θ)) for PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ, (2)
or equivalently,
xs(θ) =
1 if θ ∈ ΘFs=uniqBR[X]0 if θ /∈ ΘFs∈BR[X] for all s ∈ S and PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ. (2’)
∆U (S) :=
{
x ∈ R|U |+ : ∑k∈S xk = 1 and xl = 0 for any l ∈ U \ S
}
. When S is the whole space U itself, we omit |U |
and denote it by ∆U .
8Two behavioral strategies x, x′ ∈ FX are considered as identical, i.e., x = x′ if x(θ) = x′(θ) for PΘ-almost all
θ ∈ Θ. They indeed yield the same joint strategy distribution.
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That is, if s is the unique best response for type θ, (almost) all the agents of this type should take
it; if s is not a best response, (almost) none of these agents should take it. We leave indeterminacy
of xs(θ) in an equilibrium when there are multiple best response strategies for θ and s is just one
of them.
Examples of heterogeneous population games
Example 1 (Adding payoff heterogeneity to a homogenous population game). Denote by x¯s :=
Xs(Θ) = EΘxs ∈ [0, 1] the mass of agents who take strategy s ∈ S in the entire population over all
types in Θ.9 We call x¯ := (x¯s)s∈S ∈ ∆S the aggregate strategy distribution. If each type’s payoff
function F(θ) : X → RS depends only on aggregate strategy, that is, F satisfies F[X](θ) = F[X′](θ)
for any type θ ∈ Θ under any pair of two strategy distributions X, X′ ∈ X that yields the same
aggregate strategy distribution X(Θ) = X(Θ′), then we call the game an aggregate game.10
Especially, in the context of discrete choice models such as in Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse
(1992), it is common to introduce payoff heterogeneity in an additively separable manner. That is,
the payoff function is additively separated to the common part and the idiosyncratic part: with
type space Θ ⊂ RS, type θ = (θs)s∈S ∈ RS is defined as the idiosyncratic payoff vector for
this type, which varies among agents but does not change over time regardless of the state of
the population. Given aggregate state x¯, F0(x¯) = (F0s (x¯))s∈S ∈ RS is the common payoff vector,
shared by all the agents in the entire population. Thus, at each strategy distribution X ∈ X , the
payoff vector for a type-θ agent is
F[X](θ) = F0(X(Θ)) + θ. (3)
We call an aggregate game with such additively separable idiosyncratic payoffs an additively
separable aggregate game (ASAG). We can regard an ASAG as an extension of a homogeneous
population game F0 to a heterogeneous setting.
Example 2 (Random matching in an incomplete information game). An agent is randomly matched
with another agent from the same population: let the type space beΘ ⊂ R. Given the agent’s own
type θ and strategy s and the opponent’s type θ′ and strategy s′, the agent receives the payoff
uss′(θ, θ′); let U(θ, θ′) = (uss′(θ, θ′))(s,s′)∈S2 the payoff matrix for type θ matched with θ′. Suppose
that an agent cannot observe the opponent’s type and thus has to take a strategy independently
of the opponent’s type.
We can regard random matching in this two-player incomplete information game as a hetero-
geneous population game, where the payoff function F is defined as the expected payoff in the
9Here EΘ is the expectation operator on the probability space (Θ,BΘ,PΘ): i.e., EΘ f˜ :=
∫
Θ f˜ (θ)PΘ(dθ) for a BΘ-
measurable function f˜ : Θ→ R.
10Notice the difference from an aggregative game (Corcho´n, 1994; Jensen, 2018). The payoff depends only on the
population-weighted sum of strategies ∑s∈S sx¯s in a linearly aggregative game, or a scalar-valued summary g(x¯) ∈ R
in a generalized aggregative game; to make sense, strategies must be some quantities. Cournot competition where
strategy s is the quantity of production is a canonical example of an aggregative game. An aggregative game is a
special case of aggregate games and wider than it, since it does not require the aggregate strategy distribution x¯ ∈ RS
to reduce to a scalar.
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random matching: for a type-θ agent, the payoff from strategy s ∈ S is11
Fs[X](θ) =
∫
θ′∈Θ ∑s′∈S
uss′(θ, θ′)Xs′(dθ) =
∫
θ′∈Θ
es ·U(θ, θ′)X(dθ′).
Note that F[X](θ) =
∫
Θ U(θ, θ
′)X(dθ′) ∈ RS.
Example 3 (Random matching in an incomplete information game with transitory signals). In the
previous example, an agent’s type θ directly affects the payoff U in the game played after random
matching while the agent has no information about the opponent’s type. Instead, here we assume
that, at each matching, agents receive noisy signals of their types. That is, when a type-θ agent
is matched with a type-θ′ agent, the (former) agent and the opponent receive signals θˆ and θˆ′
respectively with probabilityPΘˆ(θˆ, θˆ
′|θ, θ′). Assume that these signals θˆ, θˆ′ are drawn from a finite
set Θˆ and an agent cannot observe the other agent’s signal. To distinguish the strategy set in this
post-match two-player game from the one in the random matching population game, denote the
former by Aˆ and assume it is a finite set: an agent chooses an action from Aˆ after receiving a
signal. When the type-θ agent receives signal θˆ ∈ Θˆ and chooses action aˆ ∈ Aˆ and its opponent
receives signal θˆ′ ∈ Θˆ and chooses action aˆ′ ∈ Aˆ, the former agent receives payoff uaˆaˆ′(θ, θ′; θˆ, θˆ′)
and the latter receives uaˆ′ aˆ(θ′, θ; θˆ′, θˆ).
Again, we can regard the random matching as a heterogeneous population game. The “strat-
egy” in the random-matching population game should be a complete contingent plan of actions,
i.e., a mapping s : Θˆ → Aˆ from each possible signal θˆ ∈ Θˆ to an action aˆ ∈ Aˆ in the post-match
two-player game. The “strategy” set S in the population game is defined as a set of mappings
from Θˆ to Aˆ; it is a finite set since Θˆ and Aˆ are finite sets. A type-θ agent’s payoff from s : Θˆ→ Aˆ
in this population game is defined as an expected payoff such that
Fs[X](θ) =
∫
θ′∈Θ ∑s′∈S
∑
(θˆ,θˆ′)∈Θˆ2
us(θˆ)s′(θˆ′)(θ, θ
′; θˆ, θˆ′)PΘˆ(θˆ, θˆ
′|θ, θ′)Xs′(dθ′).
Example 4 (Structured population game). We could interpret a type just as a “population” in a
conventional model in evolutionary game theory, while we allow continuously many populations.
Then, a type represents an affiliation to a certain subgroup of agents in the society; so Θ is a
set of subgroups. Say, a base game is a two-population game F0 : ∆S × ∆S → RS; an agent
chooses a strategy, say s, from S and then receives payoff F0s (x, x′) given the (conditional) strategy
distribution in own population x ∈ ∆S and that in the opponent’s population x′ ∈ ∆S . When the
society is divided into many subgroups, their connections may not be uniform. Say, an agent in
subgroup θ assigns weight g(θ, θ′) to the game with subgroup θ′.12 Assuming that an agent must
apply the same strategy to any opponent subgroups, the total payoff for an agent in subgroup θ
11Here es ∈ ∆S is a (column) vector whose coordinates are all 0, except the s-th one being 1.
12We can allow g(θ, θ′) to be negative, which implies that an agent has a reversed preference in interactions with
subgroup θ′. For example, if a base game is a coordination game, an agent may want to coordinate to the same action
with a ‘friend’; but, with agents in an ‘enemy’ subgroup, the agent wants to take a different action. See Example 1 in
Wu and Zusai (2019).
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from strategy s given the joint strategy distribution X is
Fs[X](θ) :=
∫
Θ
F0s (x(θ), x(θ
′))g(θ, θ′)PΘ(dθ′).
This defines a population game F. Wu and Zusai (2019) call such a game a structured population
game13
2.2 Evolutionary dynamics
In an evolutionary dynamic, an agent occasionally changes the strategy over a continuous time
horizon R+, following a Poisson process. The timing of a switch and the choice of which strategy
to switch to are determined by revision protocol ρ = (ρss′)s,s′∈S : RS → RS×S+ , a collection of
switching rate functions ρss′ : RS → R+ over all the pairs (s, s′) ∈ S × S of two strategies. An
economic agent should base the switching decision on the payoff vector that the agent is facing.
Let pi0 ∈ RS be the payoff vector for the agent. The switching rate ρss′(pi0) ∈ R+ is a Poisson
arrival rate at which this agent switches to strategy s′ ∈ S conditional on that the agent has been
taking strategy s ∈ S so far and currently faces payoff vector pi0. The analysis in this paper is
applicable to observational dynamics, in which the switching rates also depend on the strategy dis-
tribution. In addition, all our theorems hold even when different types of agents follow different
revision protocols. We confirm applicability to these extensions in Section 5, while we focus on
heterogeneity only in payoff functions and thus assume that all the types of agents share the same
revision protocol ρ until that section.
In the heterogeneous setting, different types of agents may face different payoff vectors. Letpi :
Θ → RS be a payoff vector profile that specifies payoff vector pi(θ) of each type θ. From revision
protocol ρ : RS → RS×S+ , we construct the mean dynamic of conditional strategy distribution x
over FX with function v = (vs)s∈S : RS × ∆S → RS as
x˙s(θ) = vs(pi(θ), x(θ)) := ∑
s′∈S
xs′(θ)ρs′s(pi(θ))− xs(θ) ∑
s′∈S
ρss′(pi(θ)) (4)
for each type θ ∈ Θ and each strategy s ∈ S , i.e., x˙(θ) = v(pi(θ), x(θ)). In an infinitesimal
length of time dt ∈ R, ∑s′∈S xs′(θ)ρs′s(pi(θ))dt is approximately the mass of type-θ agents who
switch to strategy s from other strategies s′ ∈ S , namely, the gross inflow to xs(θ); similarly,
xs(θ)∑s′∈S ρss′(pi(θ))dt is the gross outflow from xs(θ). Thus, vs(pi(θ), x(θ))dt is the net flow to
xs(θ) in this period of time dt.
Coupled with a heterogeneous population game F, the mean dynamic (4) of strategy distribu-
tion x defines the dynamic vF of conditional strategy distribution in FX by
x˙(θ) = vF[x](θ) := v(F[X](θ), x(θ)) ∈ RS for each type θ ∈ Θ, where X =
∫
xdPΘ.
By collecting vF[x] over types, we can further define the heterogeneous dynamic of joint strategy
13They restrict attention to a finitely many subgroups of agents who play a linear game (with no influence of the
own population) such as F0(x, x′) = U0x′ with an S× S matrix U0, while they consider both the medium run dynamic
where an agent’s affiliation is fixed exogenously (as in our model) and the long run dynamic where an agent can change
both strategy and affiliation (not covered in this paper).
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distribution in X as
X˙(BΘ) = VF[X](BΘ) :=
∫
BΘ
vF[x](θ)PΘ(dθ) for each BΘ ∈ BΘ.
Note that an agent’s type θ is persistently fixed over time: each agent draws its type θ from Θ at
time 0 and keeps it forever.
Examples of evolutionary dynamics
To make a concrete image of revision protocols, here we review major evolutionary dynamics.14
In particular, we separate the dynamics based on optimization from others because they need
different regularity conditions to guarantee the existence of a unique solution trajectory.
L-continuous revision protocols. Under an L-continuous revision protocol ρ, the switching rate
function ρss′ is a Lipschitz continuous function of the payoff vector.
Definition 1 (L-continuous revision protocols). In an L-continuous revision protocol ρ, the switch-
ing rate function ρss′ : RS → R+ of each pair of strategies s, s′ ∈ S is Lipschitz continuous:15 there
exists Lρ > 0 such that
|ρss′(pi)− ρss′(pi′)| ≤ Lρ|pi −pi′| for any s, s′ ∈ S ,pi,pi′ ∈ RS.
Example 5. In a class of pairwise comparison dynamics, the switching rate ρss′(pi) increases with
the payoff difference pis′ −pis. In particular, the revision protocol ρss′(pi) = [pis′ −pis]+ defines the
Smith dynamic (Smith, 1984).16
Example 6. Because of continuity of a switching rate function, we see smooth best response dy-
namics (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993) as constructed from continuous revision protocols. For ex-
ample, the logit dynamic (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) is constructed from ρss′(pi) = exp(µ−1pis′)
/∑s′′∈S exp(µ−1pis′′) with noise level µ > 0.
This revision protocol can be obtained from perturbed optimization: upon the receipt of each
revision opportunity, an agent draws each random perturbation in each strategy s’s payoff εs
from a double exponential distribution17 and then switches to the strategy that maximizes pis + εs
among all strategies s ∈ S . In general, a smooth best response dynamic can be constructed from
such perturbed optimization under some admissibility condition: see Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2002, 2007). Note that, after the receipt of a revision opportunity and a draw of ε ∈ RS, an agent
always switches to the optimal strategy, however small the payoff gain by this switch is.
14Readers who are familiar with major evolutionary dynamics may just scan this subsection quickly and jump to
Definitions 1 and 2.
15We adopt the L1- norm as a norm on a finite-dimensional real space, which we denote by | · |: for vector v =
(vi)Ii=1 ∈ RI , |v| := ∑Ii=1 |vi|.
16[·]+ is an operator to truncate the negative part of a number: i.e., [p˘i]+ is p˘i if p˘i ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
17Given the noise level µ, the cumulative distribution function of the double exponential distribution is P(εs ≤ c) =
exp(− exp(−µ−1c− γ)) where γ ≈ 0.5772 is Euler’s constant.
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Note that payoff perturbation ε = (εs)s∈S is transient : a different value of ε will be drawn at
each revision opportunity from an i.i.d. distribution. So, there is no (ex ante) heterogeneity in ε.
In contrast, the idiosyncratic payoff type θ in our heterogeneous dynamics is persistent.
Exact optimization protocols. In an exact optimization protocol, an agent switches only to the
best response given the current payoff vector: if strategy s′ does not yield the maximal payoff
among pi = (pi1, . . . ,piS), then ρss′(pi) = 0 regardless of the agent’s current strategy s. We allow
the switching rate to an optimal strategy to vary with pi and s, s′ ∈ S . Denote by Qss′(pi) the
conditional switching rate from s to s′, provided that s′ is already designated as the new strategy. In
the definition below, we extend the domain of Qss′ to RS while assuming its continuity over the
whole domain. The actual switching rate ρss′ is defined as the truncation of Qss′ when s′ is not a
best response; the truncation causes discontinuity.
Definition 2 (Exact optimization protocols). In an exact optimization protocol, the switching rate
function ρss′ : RS → R+ of each pair of strategies s, s′ ∈ S is expressed as
ρss′(pi) =
0 if s′ /∈ argmaxs′′∈S pis′′ ,Qss′(pi) if {s′} = argmaxs′′∈S pis′′ ,
with a Lipschitz continuous function Qss′ : RS → R+.
Example 7. In the standard best response dynamic (BRD) as defined by Hofbauer (1995b); Gilboa
and Matsui (1991), a revising agent always switches to the optimal strategy that maximizes the
current payoff with probability 1, however small the payoff gain by this optimization is. That
is, the standard BRD is constructed from an exact optimization dynamic with Qss′ ≡ 1. The
heterogeneous version is considered in Ely and Sandholm (2005); they prove that the aggregate
strategy distribution in the heterogeneous standard BRD follows a homogenized smooth BRD.
Example 8. Consider a version of BRD in which the switching rate to the unique best response Qss′
depends on the payoff difference (the payoff deficit) between the current strategy s and the best
response s′, i.e., Qss′(pi) = Q(pis′ − pis) whenever s′ ∈ argmaxs′′∈S pis′′ . Function Q : R+ → [0, 1]
is called a tempering function and assumed to be continuously differentiable and satisfy Q(0) = 0
and Q(q) > 0 whenever q > 0. Then this revision protocol yields the tempered BRD; Zusai
(2018b) constructs this revision protocol from optimization with a stochastic switching cost whose
cumulative distribution function is Q.
3 Existence of a unique solution trajectory
We verify Lipschitz continuity of a heterogeneous dynamic to guarantee the existence of a unique
solution trajectory from an arbitrary initial strategy distribution. We use a version of Picard-
Lindel of theorem (Theorem 7 in Appendix B.1) to obtain the existence of a unique solution trajec-
tory from Lipschitz continuity of heterogeneous dynamic VF. To apply this theorem, the domain
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of the dynamic must be a Banach (complete normed vector) space. Since the set of strategy distri-
butions is not a vector space, we extend the domain to the space of finite signed measuresMSΘ
with a variational norm ‖ · ‖∞SΘ (see Appendix A.2) and then prove the Lipschitz continuity of VF
on this extended domain as in (B.4) in Appendix B.1.
For this, we assume that payoff function F is Lipschitz continuous and switching rate function
ρ·· is bounded. It may sound too restrictive if we require switching rate to be bounded while
extending the domain to MA×Θ, which might be interpreted as allowing the population size to
be any finite mass. However, as we will truncate a finite signed measure M ∈ MSΘ by rounding
off too high densities in our proof (see Appendix B.1), it is enough to require those regularity
conditions to hold a subset ofMSΘ: let M¯SΘ ⊂MSΘ be the set of finite signed measures that are
absolutely continuous w.r.t. PΘ and whose density m is truncated by ±3, i.e., ms(θ) ∈ [−3, 3] for
any s ∈ S and PΘ-almost all θ.18
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function). For PΘ-almost every type θ ∈ Θ,
F(θ) : RS → RS is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant LF(θ):
|F[M](θ)− F[M′](θ)| ≤ LF(θ)‖M−M′‖∞SΘ for any M, M′ ∈ M¯SΘ.
In addition, L¯F := EΘLF < ∞.19
Assumption 2 (Bounded switching rates). There exists ρ¯ ∈ R+ such that
ρss′(F[M](θ)) ≤ ρ¯ for any s, s′ ∈ S and PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ
for any truncated finite signed measure M ∈ M¯SΘ.20
For an exact optimization protocol, the Lipschitz continuity of Qss′ is not sufficient to guarantee
Lipschitz continuity of revision protocol ρ : RS → RS×S due to truncation when the best response
strategy changes. The continuity of Qss′ assures continuous change in switching rate ρss′ with
the payoff vector, when strategy s′ remains to be the unique best response. However, payoff
changes may cause changes in the best responses, which triggers discontinuous changes in the
switching rates: the switching rate ρss′ to the new best response strategy changes from zero to
some positive rate Qss′ and the switching rate to the old one changes from positive to zero. The
next assumption states that, when the joint strategy distribution changes, the mass of agents who
experience switches of best responses grows only continuously with the distance between old
and new joint strategy distributions; thus, despite discontinuous changes in individual agents’
switching rates, the sum of these changes over all the agents is continuous.
18The bound ±3 can be replaced with any fixed numbers; here it is chosen just to be consistent with our (arbitrary
chosen) bound on the rounding function; see Appendix B.1. Note that the density x of X ∈ X is bounded as x(θ) ∈ ∆S
and thus xs(θ) ∈ [0, 1]; thus, we do not truncate joint strategy distribution X ∈ X and so X ⊂ M¯SΘ.
19Assumption 1 is satisfied in an ASAG, as long as the common payoff function F0 : RS → RS is Lipschitz continu-
ous.
20Assumption 2 is satisfied in an ASAG, if the type distribution PΘ has a bounded support and the common payoff
function F0 is continuous, even if the switching rate function itself is not bounded over the whole domain RS like the
Smith dynamic.
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Assumption 3 (Continuous change in best response). If revision protocol ρ : RS → RS×S+ is an
exact optimization protocol, then there exists LBR ∈ R+ such that
PΘ(ΘFs∈BR(M) ∩ΘFs′∈BR(M′)) ≤ LBR‖M−M′‖
for any two distinct strategies s, s′ ∈ S such that s 6= s′ and any two truncated finite signed
measures M, M′ ∈ M¯SΘ.21
This assumption implies that the best response is unique for PΘ-almost all types (let M =
M′). Note that this assumption imposes the condition on the type distribution only if the revision
protocol is an exact optimization protocol; L-continuous revision protocols do not need any such
assumption on the type distribution for the existence of a unique solution trajectory.
Theorem 1 (Lipschitz continuity of VF). Consider a heterogeneous dynamic VF in a population game
F under an L-continuous revision protocol or an exact optimization protocol. Under Assumptions 1 to 3,
function VF is Lipschitz continuous in variational-norm ‖ · ‖∞SΘ overMSΘ.
Corollary 1 (Existence of a unique solution trajectory). If VF satisfies the assumptions for Theorem 1,
then there exists a unique solution trajectory {Xt}t∈R+ ⊂ X of X˙t = VF[X] from any initial strategy
distribution X0 ∈ X .
Appendix A explains the whole outline of the proof as well as the measure-theoretic construc-
tion of heterogeneous dynamics, while heavy calculation in the proof is postponed to Section ??
of Supplementary Note. The basic idea of the proof follows a conventional proof for continuous-
strategy dynamics such as in Oechssler and Riedel (2001) and Cheung (2014). Both ours and theirs
deal with the dynamic of probability measure on a (possibly) continuous space. However, there
are two major differences in the proof for our continuous-type dynamics, compared to that for
their continuous-strategy dynamics, as discussed in the remarks below.
Remark 1. One of the differences comes from the essential defining nature of heterogeneous dy-
namics that each agent is born with a certain type θ and posses it persistently; so Xs(BΘ) can never
exceed PΘ(BΘ) for any BΘ ∈ BΘ, s ∈ S . As argued in Section 2, this assures PΘ  X, i.e., the
absolute continuity of X with respect to PΘ. This enables us to obtain a conditional strategy dis-
tribution x as a density of X w.r.t. PΘ and to interpret xs(θ) as a proportion of strategy-s players
among type-θ agents. Since an agent’s strategy revision crucially depends on the own type, it is
natural to construct dynamic v of conditional strategy distribution x(θ) at each θ, as in (4); then,
dynamic V of strategy distribution X is just derived from v, as in (B.3) in Appendix B.1.
When extending the domain of V toMSΘ, a finite signed measure may not be absolute contin-
uous with respect to PΘ and thus may not have a density. Then, how can we extend the density-
based definition (4) of our dynamic? For this, we extract the absolute continuous part of a measure
by Lebesgue decomposition theorem (Lemma 1) to keep the density-based construction of the dy-
namic.
21In an ASAG, Assumption 3 is satisfied if the distribution of differences in idiosyncratic payoffs between every two
strategies satisfies a Lipschitz-like continuity in the sense that there exists p¯Θ ∈ R such that PΘ({θ ∈ Θ : c ≤ θs′ − θs ≤
d}) ≤ (d− c) p¯Θ for any s, s′ ∈ S and any c, d ∈ R such that d > c.
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On the other hand, in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics, an agent is assumed to be
homogeneous and thus has no persistent characteristic. When they need some distribution that
dominates the strategy distribution to obtain absolute continuity, they create some ad hoc distri-
bution artificially from the strategy distribution.22 A continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamic
typically defines the transition of the measure (the mass of players in a Borel set of strategies) di-
rectly; they obtain a density only to prove Lipschitz continuity. Thus, a dominating distribution
for absolute continuity is only an artificial addition to continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics,
not an essential component of games or dynamics.
Remark 2. Another difference is that we cover exact optimization dynamics such as the standard
and tempered BRDs, whose revision protocols ρ are discontinuous. As far as the author is aware
of, the studies on continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics focus on L-continuous revision pro-
tocols: imitative dynamics (Oechssler and Riedel, 2001; Cheung, 2016), the BNN dynamic (Hof-
bauer, Oechssler, and Riedel, 2009), the gradient dynamic (Friedman and Ostrov, 2013), payoff
comparison dynamics (Cheung, 2014) and the logit dynamic (Lahkar and Riedel, 2015).
In our heterogeneous exact optimization dynamics, we suppress discontinuity in switching
rates by continuity in the mass of types of agents who experience discontinuous changes in switch-
ing rates, as assumed in Assumption 3. This continuity of the type distribution mitigates discon-
tinuity in switching rates and helps to retain continuity of the dynamic, thanks to PΘ  X.
For continuous-strategy dynamics, one might assume continuity of the ad hoc dominating dis-
tribution, argued in the above remark. But it restricts the strategy distribution to being continu-
ous on the strategy space. However, since agents are homogeneous in these dynamics, it would
be commonly expected that every agent eventually takes the same strategy, when the game has
a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For this, the assumption of continuity in the strategy
distribution is too demanding.
4 Equilibrium stationarity and stability
Our heterogeneous dynamics could be seen as an extension of evolutionary dynamics in a sin-
gle homogeneous population to (possibly) continuously many heterogeneous subpopulations,
though the existence of a unique solution trajectory requires careful formulation of the state space.
It is natural to expect that stationarity and stability of Nash equilibria are extended to equilibrium
strategy distributions in the heterogeneous setting.
We first define the properties of mean dynamic v that induce stationarity and stability of equi-
libria, separately from the population game.23 This separation is useful because both homoge-
22For example, see Oechssler and Riedel (2001, p.159) and Cheung (2014, p.2 in Online Appendix).
23This separation accords with the view proposed by Sandholm (2010) and Fox and Shamma (2013). Sandholm
(2010, especially, Sec. 1.2.2 and Ch.4) proposes to construct a mean dynamic v from agents’ revision protocol ρ and
thus has guided our attention to individual decision rules behind the collective population dynamic. Pushing further
in this direction, Fox and Shamma (2013) regard an evolutionary dynamic vF as a hybrid of a mean dynamic v (a system
that converts payoff vector pi to the transition of state x˙) and a population game F (a feedback system that converts
the current state x to payoff vector pi); they propose to define properties of v (e.g. PC in our paper; δ-passivity in their
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neous and heterogeneous dynamics stem from the same mean dynamic v (constructed from the
same revision protocol ρ). Their difference lies only in the difference in the population game
played by agents, namely the difference between F : X → CΘ and F0 : ∆S → RS.
In the homogeneous setting, the stationarity of a Nash equilibrium under vF is an immediate
consequence of the best response stationarity under v; the mean dynamic stays at a strategy distri-
bution if and only if agents are taking the best response to the current payoffs.
Definition 3 (Best response stationarity of mean dynamic). Mean dynamic v : ∆S ×RS → RS
satisfies the best response (BR) stationarity if, for any pi0 ∈ RS, x0 ∈ ∆S,
v(pi0, x0) = 0 ⇐⇒ x0 ∈ ∆(SBR(pi0)). (5)
All the evolutionary dynamics mentioned in Section 2.2, except smooth BRDs, satisfy BR sta-
tionarity.24 In a homogeneous population game, the best response stationarity implies the station-
arity of a Nash equilibrium and non-stationarity of non-equilibrium states.
The key property of evolutionary dynamics for equilibrium stability is the positive correlation:
each strategy’s payoff and the net increase in the mass of the strategy’s players are positively
correlated and the correlation is strictly positive unless the strategy distribution is unchanged.
Major evolutionary dynamics, except smooth BRDs, satisfy the positive correlation.
Definition 4 (Positive correlation of mean dynamic). Mean dynamic v : ∆S ×RS → RS satisfies
the positive correlation (PC) if
pi0 · v(pi0, x0)
≥ 0 for any pi0 ∈ RS, x0 ∈ ∆S;> 0 if v(pi0, x0) 6= 0. (6)
While stability of a Nash equilibrium is not generally guaranteed even in the homogeneous
setting, it is assured for potential games under a wide class of evolutionary dynamics. In the
homogeneous setting, population game F0 : ∆S → RS is a potential game if there is a differential
function f 0 : ∆S → R, called a potential function, such that ∇ f 0 ≡ F0.25 PC immediately implies
that the value of f 0 increases over time until it reaches a stationary point, since the definition of a
potential function implies f˙ 0(x0) = ∇ f 0(x0) · x˙0 = F0(x0) · x˙0 = F0(x0) · v(F0(x0), x0). Thus, the
homogeneous potential function f 0 works as a Lyapunov function commonly in these evolutionary
dynamics and so PC assures stability of local maxima of f 0 (Sandholm, 2001).
If a dynamic satisfies BR stationarity and PC, we call it an admissible dynamic. Pairwise
comparison dynamics and exact optimization dynamics are admissible dynamics.26
paper) apart from those of vF (e.g. equilibrium stability of potential games in our paper, and of contractive games in
their paper), which are derived by combining properties of v and assumptions on F.
24In the homogeneous version of exact optimization dynamics, the best response stationarity needs to assume
ρss′ (pi) = 0 when the current strategy s is a best response to pi; this was not assumed in our definition in cases of
multiple best responses. In the heterogeneous setting, this concern on multiple best responses is eliminated by As-
sumption 3. Hence, this assumption replaces the assumption of ρss′ (pi) = 0 for best response s to pi.
25Having a potential function is equivalent to externality symmetry: the change in the payoff of a strategy by a
change in the mass of another strategy’s players is symmetric between these two strategies. The class of potential
games includes random matching in common interest games, binary games and congestion games. Sandholm (2010,
Chapter 3) provides further explanation and examples.
26Smooth BRDs satisfy analogous properties of BR stationarity and PC for perturbed payoffs; see Sandholm (2010,
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4.1 Equilibrium Stationarity in general
In the heterogeneous setting, the best response stationarity applies to each type: the strategy dis-
tribution of a particular type θ remains unchanged if and only if almost all agents of this type
choose the best response to the current payoff for this type. Thus, it is straightforward that the
best response stationarity implies the stationarity of an equilibrium strategy distribution and non-
stationarity of non-equilibrium strategy distributions.
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium stationarity). Suppose that mean dynamic v satisfies the best response station-
arity (5). Then, in any heterogeneous population game F, an equilibrium strategy distribution is stationary
under the heterogeneous evolutionary dynamic VF derived from these v and F, and vice versa:27
VF[X] = O ⇐⇒ X is an equilibrium strategy distribution in F. (7)
This theorem suggests that the existence of a stationary point is equivalent to that of an equi-
librium state. Following the outline of the proof for the existence of a distributional equilibrium
in an incomplete information game of finitely many players by Milgrom and Weber (1985), we
can guarantee the existence of an equilibrium strategy distribution in a heterogeneous popula-
tion game that exhibits a kind of uniform continuity and boundedness over types of the payoff
function.28
Theorem 3 (Existence of equilibrium). Suppose that F : X → CΘ satisfies Assumption 1, equicon-
tinuity over types (with respect to the weak topology metrized by Prokorov metric dM),29 i.e., for each
X ∈ X and for any ε > 0, there exists δCt[X] > 0 such that
dM(X, X′) < δCt[X] =⇒
[|Fs[X](θ)− Fs[X′](θ)| < ε for any s ∈ S and PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ] ,
and near-boundedness over types, i.e., for each X ∈ X and for any ε > 0, there exists a combination of
F¯[X] ≥ 0 and δBd[X] > 0 such that for any Y, Y′ ∈ X 30
dM(Y, Y′) < δBd[X] =⇒
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
[|Fs[X](θ)| − F¯[X]]+ · (Ys(dθ)−Y′s(dθ))
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Then, there exists an equilibrium strategy distribution in the heterogeneous population game F.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions for Theorems 2 and 3, heterogeneous dynamic VF has a stationary
state.
§6.2.4). For observational dynamics such as the replicator dynamic and excess payoff dynamics, see Section 5.1. See
Sandholm (2010, Chapter 5) for summary of the relationship between dynamics and the two properties in this section.
27O = (Os)s∈S ∈ MSΘ denotes a zero measure such as Os(BΘ) = 0 for any BΘ ∈ BΘ, s ∈ S .
28Just like Milgrom and Weber (1985), we use Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, hence-
forth AP; Corollary 17.55), since an equilibrium strategy distribution can be formulated as a fixed point of the “distri-
butional” best response correspondence (check B[X] in Appendix C.2). But the objective function in the best response
correspondence is different from theirs; so we need to prove continuity of the objective function specifically for our
setting.
29See Appendix A.1 for the weak topology and Prokorov metric dM.
30Here [·]+ is an operator such as [z]+ = max{0, z}. If F[X] : Θ→ RS is bounded over Θ, i.e., there exists F¯[X] such
that |Fs[X](θ)| ≤ F¯[X] for any s ∈ S and PΘ-almost any type θ, then it is nearly bounded over types.
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4.2 Equilibrium stability in potential games
Heterogeneous potential games
For a game played in large population, a potential game is defined as a game in which payoff vec-
tor can be derived as the derivative of some scalar-valued function, i.e., a potential function. That
is, the payoff vector is a coefficient vector in linear approximation of the change in the potential
value. By generalizing this idea to a function defined on the (possibly infinite-dimensional) space
of strategy distributions, we define a heterogeneous potential game.
Definition 5 (Heterogeneous potential game). Heterogeneous population game F : S → CΘ is
called a heterogeneous potential game if there is a scalar-valued Fre´chet-differentiable function
f : X → R that is continuous in the weak topology on X and whose Fre´chet derivative coincides
with the payoff function: at each strategy distribution X ∈ X , the payoff vector function F[X] ∈ CΘ
satisfies31
f (X′) = f (X) + 〈F[X], X′ − X〉+ o(‖X′ − X‖∞SΘ) for any X′ ∈ X .
We call f a (heterogeneous) potential function for F.
Naturally in our canonical three examples, if the base game is a potential game, then its het-
erogeneous versions are also potential games.
Example 1′. Recall Example 1. Assume that the base homogeneous game F0 is a (homogeneous)
potential game with potential function f 0 : ∆S → R such that ∇ f 0 ≡ F0. Then, the ASAG is a
heterogeneous potential game, with potential function f : X → R such as32
f (X) = f 0(X(Θ)) +
∫
Θ
θ · X(dθ) for each X ∈ X . (8)
Example 2′. Recall Example 2. Now assume the base two-player game U is a potential game. For
a two-player game, it means that the payoff U(θ, θ′) is decomposed as U(θ, θ′) = U0(θ, θ′) +
1~r(θ, θ′) with a symmetric matrix U0(θ, θ′) and a row vector ~r(θ, θ′). Further, we assume that
U0(θ, θ′) = U0(θ′, θ). Hence, uss′(θ, θ′) is decomposed to u0ss′(θ, θ
′) + rs′(θ, θ′), where the former
term represents the common payoff for the two matched agents such that u0ss′(θ, θ
′) = u0a′a(θ, θ
′) =
u0a′a(θ
′, θ) and the latter term represents the payoff that is independent of the agent’s own strategy
s. Then, the random-matching population game F is a potential game, with potential function
f : X → R such that
f (X) = 0.5
∫
(θ,θ′)∈Θ2
X(dθ) ·U0(θ, θ′)X(dθ′) for each X ∈ X .
31Here, operator 〈·, ·〉 is defined as 〈pi,∆X〉 = ∫Θ ∑s∈S pis(θ)∆Xs(dθ) and ∆X ∈ MSΘ. The norm ‖ · ‖∞SΘ is the
variational norm on X to metrize the strong topology: we have ‖∆X‖∞SΘ = ∑s∈S EΘ|∆xs| by Theorem 6 in Appendix
A.2. Fre´chet differentiability is defined for the strong topology and thus continuity in the weak topology is additionally
required.
32This function f appears in the study of evolutionary implementation by Sandholm (2005, Appendix A.3). But it
was used there only to characterize an equilibrium as a solution of the KKT condition for local maxima and minima of
f .
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Example 3′. Recall Example 3. Now assume the base two-player game U is a potential game,33 and
thus the payoff U(θ, θ′) is decomposed as U(θ, θ′; θˆ, θˆ′) = U0(θ, θ′; θˆ, θˆ′)+ 1~r(θ, θ′; θˆ, θˆ′)with a sym-
metric matrix U0(θ, θ′; s, s′) and a row vector~r(θ, θ′; θˆ, θˆ′). Further, we assume that U0(θ, θ′; θˆ, θˆ′) =
U0(θ′, θ; θˆ′, θˆ) and PΘˆ(θˆ, θˆ
′|θ, θ′) = PΘˆ(θˆ′, θˆ|θ′, θ).
Then, the random-matching population game is a potential game, with potential function f :
X → R such that
f (X) = 0.5
∫
(θ,θ′)∈Θ2 ∑s′∈S
∑
(θ,θ′)∈Θˆ2
us(θˆ)s′(θˆ′)(θ, θ
′; θˆ, θˆ′)PΘˆ(θˆ, θˆ
′|θ, θ′)Xs′(dθ′)Xs(dθ) for each X ∈ X .
Example 4′. Recall Example 4. Now assume that the base game is a potential game with potential
function f 0 : ∆S × ∆S → R, i.e., ∇1 f 0(x, x′) = F0(x, x′),∇2 f 0(x, x′) = F0(x′, x), where ∇i f 0 is
the gradient vector of f 0 with respect to the strategy distribution in the i-th argument. (Recall
the first argument is the strategy distribution in the own population and the second is that in the
opponent.) Further, assume that the weight function g is symmetric: g(θ, θ′) = g(θ′, θ). Then, the
structured population game is a potential game, with potential function f : X → R such that
f (x) = 0.5
∫
(θ,θ′)∈Θ2
f 0(x(θ), x(θ′))g(θ, θ′)PΘ(dθ)PΘ(dθ′) for each X ∈ X .
Theorem 4. The heterogeneous population games in the above examples are indeed heterogeneous potential
games.
Both in the homogeneous and heterogeneous settings, all local maxima and interior local min-
ima of a potential function, and indeed all the solutions of the Karash-Kuhn-Tucker first-order
condition for maxima are equilibria in a potential game; see Sandholm (2001) for the proof for
Nash equilibria in a homogeneous potential game and Sandholm (2005, Appendix A.3) for equi-
librium strategy distributions in a heterogeneous potential game.
Stability and potential maximization
In the heterogeneous setting, the positive correlation of v implies a positive correlation between
the payoffs and the strategy distribution among each type of agents. Thus, by the same token as in
a homogeneous potential game, this guarantees that the heterogeneous potential function f works
as a Lyapunov function for equilibrium stability in a heterogeneous potential game F.
Theorem 5 (Equilibrium stability of heterogeneous potential games). Suppose that mean dynamic v
satisfies the positive correlation (6) as well as Assumptions 1 to 3. Then, in any heterogeneous potential
game F, the following holds.
33See Ui (2009) for examples of Bayesian potential games.
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i) The set of stationary strategy distributions {X ∈ X : VF[X] = O} is globally attracting under VF. A
local maximum (local strict maximum, resp.) of f is Lyapunov stable (asymptotically stable, resp.).
ii) Let X∗ be an isolated stationary strategy distribution in the sense that, in a neighborhood X∗ of
X∗ in the space X , there is no other stationary strategy distribution than X∗. a) If it is (locally)
asymptotically stable, then it is a local strict maximum of f . b) Further assume that γ : X → R
defined as γ(x) = 〈F[X], VF[X]〉 is continuous in weak topology.34 If X∗ is Lyapunov stable, then it
is a local maximum of f .
As a local maximum of f is an equilibrium strategy distribution and BR stationarity implies
equilibrium stationarity, this theorem suggests global convergence to the set of equilibrium strat-
egy distributions under admissible dynamics. Furthermore, since equilibria and potential max-
imizers can be found solely from F independently of the dynamic v, Theorems 2 and 5 suggest
that the set of stationary states and the set of locally stable states are common to all admissible
dynamics.
Corollary 3. Consider admissible dynamics in a heterogeneous population game F that satisfies Assump-
tions 1 to 3.35
i) Strategy distribution X∗ is an equilibrium in F, if and only if it is stationary in any admissible dynamic
VF.
ii) Further, suppose that F is a heterogeneous potential game. Then, the set of equilibrium strategy distri-
butions is globally attracting. Isolated equilibrium strategy distribution X∗ is a local strict maximum
of potential function f , if and only if it is asymptotically stable in any admissible dynamic VF.
If X∗ attains the global strict maximum, then it must be globally asymptotically stable in any
admissible dynamics. Thus, once we establish global asymptotic stability of X∗ under some par-
ticular admissible dynamic in a potential game, then it can be carried to all admissible dynamics.
We see below applications of this positive result to ASAGs.
Example 9 (Convergence to a free-entry equilibrium.). Consider a binary homogeneous game S =
{I, O} with negative externality: F0I (x¯I) decreases with x¯I ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the potential function
f 0 : [0, 1]→ R is given by f 0(x¯I) =
∫ x¯I
0 F
0
I (y¯)dy¯ and strictly concave. With the boundedness of the
domain [0, 1], the strict concavity of f 0 implies that the global maximum exists uniquely and there
is no other local maximum of f 0. The global maximum of f 0 is the only equilibrium of this game.
For an example in microeconomic theory to fall into this class of games, consider an entry-
exit game played by suppliers in a particular industry. To make entry and exit symmetric, it is
34This is continuous in strong topology if F and VF are continuous in strong topology, which is guaranteed by As-
sumption 1 and Theorem 1. But continuity in weak topology is stronger than that in strong topology, since convergence
in the former is weaker than that in the latter (and then the value of a “continuous” function must approach arbitrarily
close to a limit).
35In each of the two claims i,ii), the former condition (equilibrium/potential maximum) is sufficient for the latter
(stationarity/stability) to hold under all admissible heterogeneous dynamic, while the latter under any (single) admis-
sible dynamic is sufficient for the former.
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conventionally assumed that fixed costs exist but they are not sunk: fixed costs are paid only
to maintain production capacities and they are revocable when the supplier becomes inactive.
Further, the choice of entry or exit is conventionally regarded as a “long run” decision while the
choice of the quantity supplied is a “short run” decision (as well as the underlying consumers’
decisions on the demand side); thus, it is commonly assumed that the market is settled to a market
equilibrium (the state where the demand equals to the total supply) at each moment of time,
given the mass (number) of active suppliers at the moment. A free-entry or so-called “long run”
equilibrium is characterized in the homogeneous setting as a state in which the gross profit for an
active producer is equal to the fixed cost.
One may want to introduce heterogeneity in the suppliers’ fixed costs; it not only sounds
realistic but also eliminates indeterminacy of individual choices at a free-entry equilibrium. Under
the heterogeneity in fixed costs, a free-entry equilibrium should be redefined as a state in which
almost all the active producers have smaller fixed costs than the gross profit and almost all the
inactive ones have greater fixed costs.
Under perfect competition in a standard setting as in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995,
Section 10.F), the instantaneous market-equilibrium profit of an active supplier decreases with
the number of active suppliers. We can regard F0I (x¯I) as the gross profit at this instantaneous
competitive equilibrium given the current mass x¯I of active suppliers and θO(ω) as the fixed costs
of supplier ω, while setting F0O ≡ 0 and θI ≡ 0 for all agents; then, the choice between entry and
exit in perfect competition falls into an ASAG with negative externality.
Thanks to our stability result, we can justify the free-entry equilibrium as the globally stable
state in an evolutionary dynamic; indeed it is so strengthened to be stable in any admissible dy-
namics. As argued in Zusai (2018b), the tempered BRD is considered as a version of the BRD in
which a revising agent pays a stochastic switching cost. Thus, the stability of the free-entry equi-
librium under the tempered BRD suggests in this context that, even if entry and exit incur sunk
costs to build or scrap the production capacity, the “long-run” equilibrium is indeed the long-run
limit state under such an entry-exit dynamic.
By the same token, we can justify a free-entry equilibrium in the standard (static) monopolistic
competition model such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) as a dynamically stable state under an arbitrary
admissible dynamic.
Example 10 (Dynamic implementation of the social optimum.). Imagine a central planner whose
goal is to maximize the total payoff of agents in an ASAG:
EΘ [F[X](θ) · x(θ)] = F0(x¯) · x¯ +EΘ [θ · x(θ)] with x¯ = X(Θ), X =
∫
xdPΘ.
To help the central planner achieve this goal, we introduce a monetary transfer to the agent’s
payoff: now a type-θ agent’s payoff from strategy s ∈ S is F˜Ts [x](θ) := Fs[x](θ) − Ts[x¯], where
function T = (Ts)s∈S : ∆S → RS is a pricing scheme to determine the amount of the monetary
transfer (in terms of payoff) from the agent to the planner for taking each strategy given aggregate
strategy distribution x ∈ ∆S .
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In the homogeneous setting, a desirable aggregate state could be achieved by a very simple
bang-bang control that gives a subsidy for strategies that need more players and imposes a tax
on strategies that need less. By keeping the taxes and subsidies at extreme levels in their feasible
ranges, convergence can be achieved in a finite time; and it is the fastest among all the pricing
schemes. But, in the heterogeneous setting, such extreme pricing may result in excessive distortion
of the underlying strategy distribution and practically unacceptable instability. To avoid these
troubles, pricing should be less extreme and adjusted continuously over time.
Sandholm (2002, 2005) proposes the dynamic Pigouvian pricing scheme such as
Ts[x¯] = − ∑
s′∈S
x¯s′
∂F0s′
∂x¯s
(x¯) for each x¯ ∈ ∆S.
Notice that this pricing scheme does not require the central planner to know agents’ revision pro-
tocols, the type distribution, or even the current strategy distribution; the observation of aggregate
strategy distribution x¯ is enough for the planner to update Ti.
Strictly speaking, in a setting where there are finitely many payoff types, Sandholm (2002) veri-
fied that, with T being the above dynamic Pigouvian pricing scheme, F˜T has a potential function
f˜ T being the total payoff:
f˜ T(X) = EΘ [F[X](θ) · x(θ)] with X =
∫
xdPΘ.
In particular, if the common payoff function F0 exhibits negative externality, f˜ T is concave and
thus the unique social optimum is achieved in the long run through this pricing scheme regardless
of the initial state. Thanks to Theorem 5, now we can extend this claim to the games with infinitely
many payoff types.36
5 Extensions
5.1 Observational dynamics
In some of major evolutionary dynamics, an agent observes other agents’ strategies and the obser-
vation influences the agents’ switching decision. For example, an agent may imitate other agents’
strategies or the switching rate may depend on the relative payoffs compared to the average pay-
off of the observed population. We can generalize these dynamics as observational dynamics by
having the strategy distribution among observed agents x˜ ∈ ∆S , not only payoff vector pi ∈ RS,
in the argument of revision protocol ρ.
Example 11. With an excess payoff protocol, a revising agent calculates the average payoff x˜ · pi
and switches to strategy s′ with the rate that increases with the excess payoff of the new strategy
36Sandholm (2005, p.903) speculated it by referring to Ely and Sandholm (2005), which allows us to reduce the
heterogeneous standard BRD to a homogeneous smooth BRD of agents by treating persistent heterogeneity in the
former as transitory perturbation, i.e., letting an agent draw a new θ from PΘ at each revision opportunity. However,
Zusai (2017) finds that heterogeneous evolutionary dynamics generically cannot reduce to a homogeneous dynamic,
except the standard BRD and the smooth BRDs.
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pis′ − x˜ · pi. In particular, the revision protocol ρss′(pi, x˜) = [pis′ − x˜ · pi]+ defines the Brown-von
Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic (Hofbauer, 2001).37
Example 12. With an imitative protocol, a revising agent randomly picks another agent and switches
to the observed agent’s strategy s′ with the rate Iss′(pi) ∈ R+: the overall switching rate is
ρss′(pi, x˜) = x˜s′ Iss′(pi). There are several imitative protocols that yield the replicator dynamic
(Taylor and Jonker, 1978): imitative pairwise comparison Iss′ = [pis′ − pis]+ (Schlag, 1998), imita-
tion driven by dissatisfaction Iss′ = p¯i − pis with constant p¯i ∈ R (Bjo¨rnerstedt and Weibull, 1996),
and imitation of success Iss′ = pis′ − pi with constant pi ∈ R (Hofbauer, 1995a).
They fall into L-continuous revision protocols and satisfy Assumption 2.38 (Note that Assump-
tion 3 is not needed for L-continuous revision protocols.) We can readily extend all the positive
results, i.e., Theorems 1, 2 and 5, to observational dynamics, if we assume that an agent observes
the strategy distribution of the same type: a type-θ agent observes x(θ) ∈ ∆S .39 This assumption
of within-type observability matches with an assumption on imitative dynamics in the society of
finitely many subpopulations where a member of each subpopulation imitates the behavior of
those in the same subpopulation; for example, Hummel and McAfee (2018) adopt this assump-
tion.40 The proofs of these theorems in the appendix are indeed written explicitly to include x(θ)
as an argument of revision protocol ρ.
To maintain the existence of a unique solution trajectory (Theorem 1) and stationarity of an
equilibrium strategy distribution (Theorem 2), this assumption of within-type observability can
be replaced with an alternative assumption that an agent observes the aggregate strategy distri-
bution x¯ = X(Θ), instead of x(θ), and applies the agent’s own current payoff vector F[X](θ) as
pi.41 But, then PC may not be extended from the homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous set-
ting. If observations are sampled from the entire population, stability analysis becomes essentially
different from how we have investigated stability in this paper.42
37 Excess payoff dynamics allow innovation of a new strategy, while imitative dynamics do not. Thus, stationarity
and stability of equilibria are restricted to the interior of the strategy space for the latter dynamics while they are not
for the former. Further, it is known that excess payoff dynamics guarantee global asymptotic stability of the Nash
equilibrium set in a contractive game (Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009); also known as a negative semidefinite game or
a stable game), while the latter guarantees only Lyapunov stability unless contractiveness is strict; see Sandholm (2010).
Also, in a continuous strategy space, they result in different characterizations of local stability; see Hofbauer, Oechssler,
and Riedel (2009).
38Precisely for observational dynamics, ρ¯ is an upper bound on ρss′ (F[m¯](θ), m(θ)). As ρ has two arguments, its
Lipschitz continuity (under L1 norm on finite-dimensional vectors; see footnote 15) should mean the existence of Lρ
such as |ρss′ (pi, x˜)− ρss′ (pi′, x˜′)| ≤ Lρ|(pi, x˜)− (pi′, x˜′)| = Lρ(|pi −pi′|+ |x˜− x˜′|) for any s, s′ ∈ S ,pi,pi′ ∈ RS, x˜, x˜′ ∈
∆S . Technically, we can allow ρ·· to depend on X ∈ X , not only on x˜ ∈ ∆S . Then, this Lipschitz continuity condition
is simply generalized as |ρss′ (pi, x˜)− ρss′ (pi′, x˜′)| ≤ Lρ(|pi −pi′|+ ‖X− X′‖∞SΘ). We can readily confirm that the proof
for Theorem 1 needs no change, just by glancing over calculation in Supplementary Note ??.
39Corollary 3 holds for excess payoff dynamics. Imitative dynamics such as the replicator dynamic satisfy the best
response stationarity only if x0 is in the interior of ∆S , and thus these theorems hold for imitative dynamics in the
interior of X .
40However, Hummel and McAfee (2018) simply apply a general formula of the replicator dynamic to the evolution
of type-conditional strategy distribution and do not construct the dynamic from a revision protocol; thus they do not
explicitly discuss imitation.
41In an ASAG, it could be done without assuming that an agent precisely knows F[X](θ), if an agent learn only the
common payoffs F0[X] from sampled agents and then distorts it by the agent’s own idiosyncratic payoffs θ.
42About unobservable heterogeneity in aspiration levels in imitative dynamics, Sawa and Zusai (2014) verify that,
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5.2 Heterogeneity in revision protocols
All of our results are robust to heterogeneity in revision protocols. Now, let each type θ ∈ Θ of
agents not only have its peculiar payoff function F(θ) but also follow its own revision protocol
ρθ; in the case of an exact optimization protocol, this should be constructed from the conditional
switching rate function (Qθss′)(i,j)∈S2 . The mean dynamic v
θ : RS × ∆S → ∆S is defined by tagging
θ to (4) as
x˙s(θ) = vθs (pi(θ), x(θ)) := ∑
s′∈S
xs′(θ)ρθs′s(pi(θ))− xs(θ) ∑
s′∈S
ρθss′(pi(θ)) for each s ∈ S .
Then, heterogeneous dynamic vF is defined in the same fashion as x˙(θ) = vF[x](θ) := vθ(F[EΘx](θ), x(θ)).
Again, these notations are explicitly shown in the proofs in the appendix. Theorems 2 and 5 hold
as long as the assumptions in each theorem are satisfied with vθ of (almost) every type θ ∈ Θ.
The existence of a unique solution trajectory (Theorem 1) is also guaranteed, though we should
clarify what the assumptions (including the Lipschitz continuities assumed in Definitions 1 and 2)
are imposed on heterogeneous revision protocols. For this, let ΘC be the set of types that adopt
any of L-continuous revision protocols and ΘE be the set of those who use exact optimization
protocols with any conditional switching rate functions. Then, the assumptions for Theorem 1
should read as follows.
Definition 1 There should be a common Lipschitz constant L¯ρ of the switching rate function over
almost all the types in ΘC: |ρθss′(pi) − ρθss′(pi′)| ≤ L¯ρ|pi − pi′| for any s, s′ ∈ S ,pi,pi′ ∈ RS
and PΘ-almost all θ ∈ ΘC.
Definition 2 There should be a common Lipschitz constants L¯Q of the conditional switching rate
functions Qθss′ over almost all the types in ΘE: |Qθss′(pi) − Qθss′(pi′)| ≤ L¯Q|pi − pi′| for any
s, s′ ∈ S ,pi,pi′ ∈ RS and PΘ-almost all θ ∈ ΘE.
Assumption 1 Since this is about payoff types, this needs no modification.
Assumption 2 There should be a common upper bound ρ¯ on the switching rate functions ρθss′ over
almost all the types: ρθss′(F[M](θ)) ≤ ρ¯ for any truncated finite signed measure M ∈ M¯SΘ,
any s, s′ ∈ S and, PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption 3 The assumption is needed as long as PΘ(ΘE) > 0; otherwise, it is not needed.
Of course, this extension to heterogeneous revision protocols cover observational dynamics.
While we assume within-type observability for Nash stationarity and stability, it is not needed for
the existence of a unique solution trajectory. Thus, our existence theorem would provide the most
fundamental starting point to study the effect of both observable and unobservable heterogeneity
of revision protocols on population dynamics and equilibrium stability.
although the dynamic becomes more complicated and basic properties such as positive correlation do not hold, long-
run outcomes are robust to the introduction of unobservable heterogeneity. For this, they verify that the difference in
the aggregate strategy distribution between under the heterogeneous dynamic and under the homogeneous dynamic
vanishes in the long run in any game, whether the dynamic converges to equilibrium or not.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we extend evolutionary dynamics to allow (possibly) continuously many types un-
der persistent heterogeneity in payoff functions and revision protocols. With a rigorous formula-
tion of a heterogeneous evolutionary dynamic as a differential equation over the space of probabil-
ity measures, we clarify the regularity conditions on the revision protocol, the game and the type
distribution to guarantee the existence of a unique solution path from an arbitrary initial state. We
extend equilibrium stationarity in general and equilibrium stability in potential games from the
homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous setting. This study establishes the foundation to study
evolution in heterogeneous populations and opens up a wide field of applications.
Our result on extension of equilibrium stability in potential games suggests that any admissi-
ble dynamics share global stability of the equilibrium set and also asymptotic stability of each local
maximizer of the potential function. However, different admissible dynamics may have different
basins of attraction and thus they may converge to different locally stable equilibria when starting
from the same initial state. Especially, in aggregate games, the preceding studies (Ely and Sand-
holm, 2005; Blonski, 1999) assume aggregability in the sense that the dynamic of aggregate state
is completely predictable from its current state, independently of the underlying joint strategy
distribution over different types. However, Zusai (2017) argues that evolutionary dynamics are
generically nonaggregable, except the standard and smoothed BRDs, even in aggregate games. On
the positive side, it proposes to use nonaggregability to select aggregate equilibria by requiring ro-
bustness of stability to any distortion in the underlying strategy distribution under nonaggregable
dynamics.43
In this paper, we confine our analysis to a game with finitely many strategies while allowing
infinitely many types. The formulation and techniques for our study are borrowed from those for
evolution in games with continuously many strategies, though it brings new issues as remarked
in Section 3. While we might be able to use similar techniques based on measure theory, we may
need different regularity conditions for evolution on infinite-dimensional type and strategy space.
It is left to future research.
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A Appendix to Section 2
A.1 Measure-theoretic definition of strategy distribution
This subsection provides mathematically rigorous definitions of a joint strategy distribution and a
conditional strategy distribution based on measure theory. Proofs in the appendices deal with joint
strategy distributions to properly utilize the Lyapunov stability theorem (Theorem 8 in Appendix
B) and to borrow measure-theoretic construction of evolutionary dynamics on a continuous strat-
egy space as in Oechssler and Riedel (2001, 2002) and Cheung (2014).
Let Ω := [0, 1] ⊂ R be the set (population) of agents. We define a (probability) measure
PΩ : BΩ → [0, 1] as the Lebesgue measure soPΩ(Ω) = 1. Denote by BΩ the Lebesgue σ-field over
Ω. Let s(ω) ∈ S denote the strategy taken by agent ω. We restrict strategy profile s : Ω → S to a
BΩ-measurable function.
Let θ(ω) ∈ Θ be the type of agent ω ∈ Ω; recall that type space Θ is a complete separable
space with metric dΘ. Denote by BΘ be the Borel σ-field on this metric space. Agents’ type profile
θ : Ω→ RT is assumed to be measurable with respect to BΩ. Then, it induces probability measure
PΘ : BΘ → [0, 1] by PΘ(BΘ) := PΩ({ω ∈ Ω : θ(ω) ∈ BΘ}) for each BΘ ∈ BΘ.
Combination of strategy profile s : Ω → S and type profile θ : Ω → Θ generates a finite
measure Xs : BΘ → R+ for each s ∈ S from PΩ:
Xs(BΘ) := PΩ({ω ∈ Ω : s(ω) = s and θ(ω) ∈ BΘ}) for each BΘ ∈ BΘ.
Xs(BΘ) represents the mass of strategy-s players whose types belong to set BΘ. The (joint) strategy
distribution X is collection of these measures Xs, i.e., X = (Xs)s∈S . We can see this vector measure
as a joint probability measure over the product space S ×Θ. 44 The space of joint strategy distri-
butions X is thus the set of probability measures over S ×Θ such that the marginal distribution
of types coincides with PΘ, i.e., ∑s∈S Xs(BΘ) = PΘ(BΘ) for each BΘ ∈ BΘ. Let BSΘ be the Borel
σ-field on the product space S ×Θ.
Since X must satisfy Xs(BΘ) ≤ PΘ(BΘ) for each s ∈ S , Xs is dominated by PΘ in the sense that
PΘ(BΘ) = 0 =⇒ Xs(BΘ) = 0 for each BΘ ∈ BΘ. (A.1)
Denote by Xs  PΘ this dominance relation, i.e., absolute continuity of Xs with respect to PΘ.
It follows by Radon-Nikodym theorem that there exists a BΘ-measurable nonnegative function
xs : Θ→ R+ such that
Xs(BΘ) =
∫
BΘ
xs(θ)PΘ(dθ) for any BΘ ∈ BΘ.
xs is the density function of measure Xs. The density is determined uniquely in the sense that, if
another measurable function x′s satisfies Xs(BΘ) =
∫
BΘ
x′s(θ)PΘ(dθ) for all BΘ ∈ BΘ, then x′s(θ) =
44Abusing notation, we could say that X defines a measure of a Borel set BSΘ on the product space S ×Θ by
X(BSΘ) := ∑
s∈S
Xs({θ ∈ Θ : (a, θ) ∈ BSΘ}) = PΩ({ω ∈ Ω : (s(ω), θ(ω)) ∈ BSΘ}).
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xs(θ) for PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ.
X is dominated by PΘ in the sense that Xs  PΘ for all s ∈ S ; we abuse notation to denote
this domination by X  PΘ. Note that the dominance of joint strategy distribution X by the
type distribution PΘ is peculiar to heterogeneous dynamics, making a difference in the proof of
Lipschitz continuity of the dynamic from the one for continuous strategy dynamics. See Remark 1
in Section 3.
The collection of Radon-Nikodym densities x = (xs)s∈S : Θ → RS+ is the type-conditional
strategy distribution corresponding to X. From the fact that ∑s∈S Xs(BΘ) = PΘ(BΘ) and Xs(BΘ) ≥
0 for any BΘ ∈ BΘ and s ∈ S , we can confirm that x(θ) is a probability vector for almost all types:
x(θ) ∈ ∆S for PΘ-almost all θ ∈ Θ.
A.2 Topology of the space of joint strategy distributions
Choice of a topology is a sensitive issue when we argue dynamics of a probability measure over
a continuous space. We follow the convention in the literature on evolutionary dynamics over a
continuous strategy space, such as in Cheung (2014). That is, we use the strong topology to prove
the existence of a unique solution path and the weak topology to obtain stability of equilibrium
strategy distribution. See Cheung (2014, Section 4) for a detailed explanation on the strong and
weak topology in evolutionary dynamics on a continuous space.
Below we define these two topologies on the space of finite signed measuresMSΘ. Note that
X ⊂ MSΘ and that MSΘ is the tangent space of X . This space MSΘ is a vector space and a
transition vector stays in this extended space.
The strong topology is metrized by the variational norm ‖ · ‖∞SΘ defined as
‖M‖∞SΘ = sup
g
{∣∣∣∣∣∑s∈S
∫
θ∈Θ
gs(θ)Ms(dθ)
∣∣∣∣∣ : sup(a,θ)∈S×Θ |gs(θ)| ≤ 1
}
,
where the first sup is taken over the set of measurable functions g = (gs)s∈S on (S × Θ,BSΘ).
Conditional strategy distributions belong to FX , i.e., the space of BΘ-measurable vector functions
fromΘ to ∆S. Note that, if M PΘ, then there uniquely exists a Radon-Nikodym density m ∈ FX
such that M =
∫
mdPΘ in the sense we defined in Appendix A.1. The theorem below suggests
that the variational norm on X is equivalent to the L1-norm on FX .45 The proof is provided in
Section ?? of Supplementary Note.46
Theorem 6. For any finite signed measure M ∈ MSΘ with density m = (ms)s∈S , we have
‖M‖∞SΘ = EΘ|m(θ)| =
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
|ms(θ)|PΘ(dθ). (A.2)
With the variational norm, the normed vector space (MSΘ, ‖ · ‖∞SΘ) is a Banach space; but not
45Ely and Sandholm (2005) define the standard BRD under payoff heterogeneity directly as a dynamic of x ∈ FX
and adopt L1 norm on FX .
46This density-based formula of the variational norm comes essentially from Theorem 5 in Oechssler and Riedel
(2001).
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with weak topology. By Zeidler (1986, Cor. 3.9), boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of the
dynamic in the strong topology jointly guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution path
of the dynamic. See Theorem 7 in Appendix B.1.
Under the weak topology on the set of measures over space S ×Θ, a mapping fromMSΘ → R
such as µ 7→ ∫S f dµ is continuous for any bounded and continuous function f : S ×Θ → R. The
product space S ×Θ is separable with metric dSΘ : (S ×Θ)2 → R+ given by47
dSΘ((s, θ), (s′, θ′)) := 1{s 6= s′}+ dΘ(θ, θ′).
Then, the weak topology is metrized by Prokhorov metric dM :MSΘ2 → R+ such that48
dM(M, M′) := inf{ε > 0 : M(BSΘ) ≤ M′(BεSΘ) + ε
and M′(BSΘ) ≤ M(BεSΘ) + ε for all BSΘ ∈ BSΘ},
where BεSΘ is defined from BSΘ as B
ε
SΘ := {(s, θ) ∈ S ×Θ : dSΘ((s, θ), (s′, θ′)) < ε with some (s′, θ′) ∈
BSΘ}.49 Under the weak topology, the space of probability measures, i.e., the space of joint strat-
egy distributions becomes compact. Then, we can apply the Lyapunov stability theorem, as in
Cheung (2014, Thm. 6). See Theorem 8 in Appendix C.4.
B Appendix to Section 3
B.1 Sketch of Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the existence of a unique solution trajectory under a heterogeneous dynamic by veri-
fying it for the corresponding dynamic of the joint strategy distribution, appealing to the equiva-
lence between conditional strategy distributions and joint strategy distributions. Here we sketch
the outline of the proof, while the complete presentation of the proof is provided in Section ?? of
Supplementary Note.
First, we construct the mean dynamic of joint strategy distribution V = (Vs)s∈S : X × CΘ →
MSΘ by gathering the mean dynamic vθ of a conditional strategy distribution, defined by (4),
over all θ ∈ Θ: for each strategy s ∈ S ,
X˙s(BΘ) = Vs[X,pi](BΘ) =
∫
BΘ
vθs [pi(θ), x(θ)]PΘ(dθ)
=
∫
BΘ
∑
s′∈S
ρθs′s(pi(θ), x(θ))Xs′(dθ)−
∫
BΘ
{
∑
s′∈S
ρθss′(pi(θ), x(θ))
}
Xs(dθ) (B.3)
47The metric dSΘ is a product metric constructed from the discrete norm on S and metric dΘ on Θ. Notice S < ∞
andΘ is separable under dΘ; so the product metric dSΘ makes S ×Θ separable. Here 1{s 6= s′} is an indicator function
and takes 1 if s 6= s′ and 0 otherwise.
48If there is no payoff heterogeneity, i.e., Θ = {θ0}, then strategy distribution M can be simply represented by an A-
dimensional vector (m¯s)s∈S ∈ RS such that m¯s = Ms({θ0}). Then, dM(M, M′) = ε is equivalent to sups∈S |m¯s − m¯′s| =
ε. So the metric dM reduces to the sup norm on RS.
49If ε < 1, the condition for (a, θ) ∈ BεSΘ is equivalent to the existence of θ′ ∈ Θ such that dΘ(θ, θ′) < ε and
(a, θ′) ∈ BSΘ.
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for each BΘ ∈ BΘ, given joint strategy distribution X =
∫
xdPΘ ∈ X and payoff profile pi : Θ →
RS. In short, we write X˙ = V[X,pi].
In a population game F : ∆S ×Θ→ RS, the mean dynamic (B.3) of a joint strategy distribution
defines an autonomous dynamic VF over X by
X˙ = VF[X] := V[X, F[X]] ∈ MSΘ
for each joint strategy distribution X ∈ X . Then, this dynamic of joint strategy distribution VF
matches with the dynamic of conditional strategy distribution vF defined in Section 2.2, in the
sense that VF[X](BΘ) =
∫
BΘ
vF[x](θ)PΘ(dθ), where x is the corresponding conditional strategy
distribution, i.e., the Radon-Nikodym density of X.
To argue the existence of a unique solution trajectory, we exploit the known result on a Lips-
chitz continuous dynamic over a Banach space as in the theorem below.50
Theorem 7 (Zeidler, 1986: Corollary 3.9). Consider a dynamic z˙ = V(z) with V : Z → Z . If the space
Z is a Banach space and the dynamic V is Lipschitz continuous and bounded, then there exists a unique
solution {zt}t∈R+ from any initial state in z0 ∈ Z .
For this, we need a Banach space. But, the space of joint strategy distributions X is not a vector
space. Thus, we extend the domain of the dynamic to the space of finite signed measuresMS×Θ.
Since the mean dynamic V[X,pi](BΘ) is defined by collecting the transition of the density x(θ)
over types θ ∈ BΘ, we still need a density of a measure on this extended space. However, a finite
signed measure may not be absolutely continuous with respect to the type distribution PΘ. We
use the Lebesgue decomposition theorem to extract the absolutely continuous part.
Lemma 1 (Rudin, 1987: §6.10). For any finite signed measure M = (Ms)s∈S ∈ MSΘ, there is a pair of
finite signed measures M˜ = (M˜s)s∈S , Mˆ = (Mˆs)s∈S ∈ MSΘ such that, for each s ∈ S ,
i) Ms = M˜s + Mˆs;
ii) M˜s  PΘ, i.e., PΘ(BΘ) = 0 =⇒ M˜s(BΘ) = 0 for any BΘ ∈ BΘ
iii) Mˆs ⊥ PΘ, i.e., there exists Es ∈ BΘ such that Mˆs(BΘ ∩ Es) = 0 and PΘ(BΘ \ Es) = 0 for any
BΘ ∈ BΘ.
The part (ii) implies that M˜ has density m˜ = (m˜s)s∈S with respect toPΘ. Besides, ‖M˜‖ ≤ ‖M‖,
since i) and ii) imply ‖M‖ = ‖M˜‖+ ‖Mˆ‖. We extend V toMA×Θ by discarding the orthogonal
part Mˆ and applying (B.3) to the continuous part M˜. This need for the Lebesgue decomposition
is the first difference from evolutionary dynamics on a continuous strategy space: see Remark 1 in
Section 3. Let M˜SΘ be the space of PΘ-absolutely continuous measures.
Yet, the density function m˜ of M˜ may not be bounded, while that of a joint strategy distribution,
i.e., a conditional strategy distribution x is bounded in the sense that x(θ) of almost every type θ
50See Ely and Sandholm (2005, Theorem A.3.) for a version of this theorem for FX , which guarantees the existence
of a unique solution trajectory for a heterogeneous dynamic on FX with L1-norm from Lipschitz continuity of the
dynamic.
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belongs to a bounded set ∆S . We will utilize the assumptions that the payoff function F and the
switching rate function ρθ (or the conditional switching rate function Qss′ for exact optimization
protocols) are continuous and thus bounded if its domain is restricted to a compact set. To restrict
the value of the density function into a compact domain, we truncate m˜(θ) of each θ by a rounding
function µ = (µs′)s′∈S : RS → [−3, 3]S such that µ(z) = z if z ∈ ∆S and µ is Lipschitz continuous
with constant Lµ.51
Then, we redefine function vF : M˜SΘ ×Θ→ RS on the extended domain by
vF[M˜](θ) = vθ(F[EΘµ(m˜(θ))](θ), µ(m˜(θ)))
for each s ∈ S and any PΘ-absolutely continuous finite signed vector measure M˜ ∈ M˜SΘ with
the Radon-Nikodym density m˜. This leads to the extension of VF := (VFs )s∈S toMSΘ, such as
VFs [M](BΘ) =
∫
BΘ
vFs [M˜](θ)PΘ(dθ)
for each s ∈ S , any BΘ ∈ BΘ and any finite signed vector measure M ∈ MSΘ; here M˜ is the PΘ-
absolutely continuous part of M in the Lebesgue decomposition of M. As only this part matters
to the value of VF, we have VF[M] = VF[M˜].
To prove Lipschitz continuity of VF, we look at VF on M˜SΘ: in Supplementary Note ??, we
find LFV > 0 such that
52
‖VF[M˜]−VF[M˜′]‖ ≤ LFV‖M˜− M˜′‖ for any M˜, M˜′ ∈ M˜SΘ. (B.4)
Then, this implies Lipschitz continuity over the whole spaceMSΘ, because ‖M˜− M˜′‖ ≤ ‖M−
M′‖ for any M = M˜ + Mˆ, M′ = M˜′ + Mˆ′ ∈ MSΘ.
For an L-continuous revision protocol, the Lipschitz continuity of VF is a natural consequence
of the Lipschitz continuity of switching rate function ρθ and of payoff function F.
On the other hand, an exact optimization protocol is discontinuous. If the best response strate-
gies for some type of agents have changed by a change in the joint strategy distribution from M˜ to
M˜′, these agents should experience discontinuous changes in the switching rates. However, these
discontinuous changes in their switching rates are bounded thanks to the boundedness of switch-
ing rate function ρθ. Further, thanks to Assumption 3, the mass of agents who belong to such
types increases only (Lipschitz) continuously with the change in the joint strategy distribution.53
As a result, the aggregate change in their switching rates grows only continuously. This mitigation
of discontinuity in an exact optimization protocol by continuity of the type distribution marks the
second difference from the preceding studies on continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics: see
Remark 2 in Section 3.
51For example, define µ0 : R → [−3, 3] such as µ0(z) := −3 + exp(z + 2) for z < −2, µ0(z) := z for z ∈ [−2, 2]
and µ0(z) := 3− exp(2− z) for z > 2. Then, define vector function µ = (µs)s∈S by µs(z) = µ0(zs) for each s ∈ S and
z ∈ ∆S.
52Here the norm ‖ · ‖ is the variational norm, defined in Appendix A.2.
53Note that this assumption also restricts the mass of types who have multiple best responses to a null set (zero
measure) in PΘ.
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C Appendix to Section 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First of all, joint strategy distribution X =
∫
xdPΘ being an equilibrium (1) is equivalent
to the corresponding conditional strategy distribution x being an equilibrium (2), i.e., x(θ) ∈
∆SFBR[X](θ) for PΘ-almost all types θ. Then, for such θ, x(θ) ∈ ∆SFBR[X](θ) is equivalent to
vF[x](θ) = 0 by (5). It holds for PΘ-almost all types θ, which means the stationarity of condi-
tional strategy distribution x. This is equivalent to stationarity of joint strategy distribution X, i.e.,
VF[X] = O.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3
First of all, notice that an equilibrium strategy distribution is a fixed point of the “distributional
strategy” best response correspondence B : X ⇒ X defined as
B[X] := argmax
Y∈X
EΘF[X] · Y for each X ∈ X .
Below we prove that the assumptions in Theorem 3 assures that the maximized function
EΘF[X] · Y =
∫
Θ
F[X](θ) · Y(dθ)
is continuous in (X, Y) ∈ X 2.
Proof of continuity of EΘF[X] · Y. Fix ε > 0 and (X, Y) ∈ X 2 arbitrarily. By equicontinuity of F, we
have some δCt[X] > 0 such that, whenever dM(X′, X) < δCt[X], we have |Fs[X′](θ)− Fs[X](θ)| <
0.5ε for any s ∈ S and PΘ-almost all θ. The latter statement implies, for any Y′ ∈ X ,∣∣∣∣∫Θ (F[X′](θ)− F[X](θ)) · Y′(dθ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫Θ ∑s∈S
∣∣Fs[X′](θ)− Fs[X](θ)∣∣Y′s(dθ)
<
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
0.5εY′s(dθ) = 0.5ε
∫
Θ
P(dθ) = 0.5ε.
By near-boundedness of F, there exists a combination of F¯[X] ∈ R and δ1Bd[X] > 0 such that
dM(Y, Y′) < δ1Bd[X] =⇒
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
[|Fs[X](θ)| − F¯[X]]+ · (Y(dθ)− Y′(dθ))
∣∣∣∣∣ < 0.25ε.
For each s ∈ S , define set Θεs ⊂ Θ and function gεs[X] : Θ→ R+ by
Θεs := {θ : |Fs[X](θ)| > F¯[X]}, gεs[X](θ) := 1{θ ∈ Θεs}F¯[X] + 1{θ /∈ Θεs}|Fs[X](θ)|.
Notice that gεs[X](θ) + [|Fs[X](θ)| − F¯[X]]+ ≡ |Fs[X](θ)| for any θ ∈ Θ. Since Fs[X] : Θ → R
is measurable, Θεs is a measurable set and gεs[X] is a measurable function on Θ. This function is
bounded by definition and also continuous; so is the vector-valued function gε[X] = (gεs[X])s∈S :
Θ → RS+. Hence, under the weak topology,
∫
Θ g
ε[X](θ) ·M(dθ) is a continuous function of finite
signed measure M ∈ MSΘ; there exists δ2Bd[X] > 0 such that, whenever Y′ satisfies, dM(Y′, Y) <
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δ2Bd[X], we have satisfies
0.25ε >
∣∣∣∣∫Θ gε[X](θ) · (Y′(dθ)− Y(dθ))
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
gεs[X](θ)
(
Y′s(dθ)−Ys(dθ)
)∣∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore, any Y′ such as dM(Y′, Y) < δY := min{δ1Bd[X], δ2Bd[X]} satisfies∣∣∣∣∫Θ F[X](θ) · (Y′(dθ)− Y(dθ))
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
Fs[X](θ)
(
Y′s(dθ)−Ys(dθ)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
|Fs[X](θ)|
(
Y′s(dθ)−Ys(dθ)
)∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
(
gεs[X](θ) + [|Fs[X](θ)| − F¯[X]]+
) (
Y′s(dθ)−Ys(dθ)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
gεs[X](θ)
(
Y′s(dθ)−Ys(dθ)
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
[|Fs[X](θ)| − F¯[X]]+ · (Y(dθ)− Y′(dθ))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤0.25ε+ 0.25ε = 0.5ε.
Therefore, any pair of (X′, Y) ∈ X 2 such that dM(X′, X) < δCt[X] and dM(Y′, Y) < δY satisfies∣∣EΘF[X′] · Y′ −EΘF[X] · Y∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫Θ F[X′](θ) · Y′(dθ)−
∫
Θ
F[X](θ) · Y(dθ)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫Θ (F[X′](θ)− F[X](θ)) · Y′(dθ)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫Θ F[X](θ) · (Y′(dθ)− Y(dθ))
∣∣∣∣
<0.5ε+ 0.5ε = ε.
That is, EΘF[X] · Y is continuous (with respect to the variational norm) in X 2 at each (X, Y) ∈
X 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. To show the existence of a fixed point of the “mixed strategy” best response
correspondence B : X ⇒ X , we use Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border,
2006, henceforth AP; Corollary 17.55). First, we confirm the assumptions on domain X . The
type space Θ is a complete separable metric space. Since the domain X is regarded as the set of
distributional strategies over the product of this type space Θ and the finite strategy space S , we
can borrow the result in Milgrom and Weber (1985) about X :54 X is a nonempty, compact and
convex subspace ofMSΘ, which is convex and Hausdorff under the weak topology.
With nonemptiness and compactness of X , continuity of the maximized function EΘF[X] · Y
implies by Berge’s maximum theorem (AP, Theorem 17.31) that B is nonempty, compact-valued
and upper hemicontinuous. In the Hausdorff metric space, this further implies by AP Theorem
17.10 that B has a closed graph. SinceEΘF[X] ·Y is a linear function of Y, B is convex-valued. From
the aforementioned properties of X and these properties of B, Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem
guarantees the existence of a fixed point of B (as well as compactness of the set of fixed points).
54We could interpretEΘF[X] ·Y as the “payoff” from distributional strategy X in their finite-player model. However,
this is different from their payoff function, which is constructed from a normal-form game and thus is bilinear in X and
Y.
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C.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Here we prove the claim for Example 1′. Proofs for the other examples can be done in a
similar fashion and thus they are relegated to Supplementary Note. As f (X) = f 0(X(Θ)) +EΘ[θ ·
x(θ)], weak continuity of f is obtained from continuity of f 0 and the dominated convergence
theorem. By applying the definition of f to X + ∆X, we have
f (X + ∆X) = f 0(x¯ + ∆x¯) +
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
θs(Xs + ∆Xs)(dθ)
=
{
f 0(x¯) +∇ f 0(x¯) · ∆x¯ + o(|∆x¯|)}+{∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
θsXs(dθ) +
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
θs∆Xs(dθ)
}
= f (X) + F0(x¯) · ∆x¯ +
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
θs∆Xs(dθ) + o(|∆x¯|)
= f (X) +
∫
Θ
∑
s∈S
(F0s (x¯) + θs)∆Xs(dθ) + o(|∆x¯|).
Here x¯ = X(Θ) and ∆x¯ = ∆X(Θ). The second equality comes from differentiability of f 0; the third
is from the assumption that f 0 is a potential function of F0 and the definition of f applied to X.
Then, we should recall Fs[X(Θ)](θ) = F0s (X(Θ)) + θs. So the second term is 〈F[X(Θ)],∆X〉. About
the third error term, note that |∆x¯| = |∆X(Θ)| ≤ ‖∆X‖. Therefore, we obtain
f (X + ∆X) = f (X) + 〈F[X(Θ)],∆X〉+ o(‖∆X‖).
Thus, f is (Fre´chet) differentiable with derivative ∇ f (X) ≡ F[X(Θ)]. So we have verified that f is
a potential function of the game F defined on X .
C.4 Proof of Theorem 5
For stability, we use the weak topology and apply the Lyapunov stability theorem, as in Cheung
(2014).
Theorem 8 (Cheung, 2014: Theorems 5–6, Corollary 2). Let Z ⊂ X be a closed set and let Y ⊂ X
be a neighborhood of Z in the weak topology on X . Let L : Y → R be a decreasing Lyapunov function
for dynamic V: that is, L is continuous with respect to the weak topology and Fre´chet-differentiable with
L˙(X) = 〈∇L(X), V[X]〉 ≤ 0 for all X ∈ Y. Then, the following holds.
i) Any solution path starting from Y converges to the set {X ∈ Y : L˙(X) = 0} with respect to the weak
topology; i.e., this set is attracting under V.
ii) If L−1(0) = Z, Z is Lyapunov stable under V with respect to the weak topology. Furthermore, if
L˙(X) < 0 whenever X ∈ Y \ Z, then Z is asymptotically stable under V.
Part i) holds for an increasing Lyapunov function; part ii) is retained by defining Z as an
isolated set of local maxima.
Proof. i) Since f is a potential function for F, we have
f˙ (X) = 〈∇ f (X), X˙〉 = 〈F[X], VF[X]〉 = EΘ
[
F[X](θ) · vF[x](θ)] ,
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where x¯ = X(Θ) and X =
∫
Θ xdPΘ.
Since vF[x](θ) = vθ(F[X](θ), x(θ)), the first part of (6) implies F[X](θ) · vF[x](θ) ≥ 0 for all θ
and thus
f˙ (X) = EΘ
[
F[X](θ) · vF[x](θ)] ≥ 0.
Suppose X is not a stationarity state under dynamic VF, which is equivalent to vF[x](θ) 6= 0
for PΘ-almost all types θ . For a type with vF[x](θ) 6= 0, the second part of (6) implies F[x¯](θ) ·
vF[x](θ) > 0. Since this holds for a positive mass of types, we have
f˙ (X) = EΘ
[
F[x¯](θ) · vF[x](θ)] > 0.
Therefore, f is a strictly increasing Lyapunov function and the set {X ∈ X : f˙ (X) = 0} is the set of
stationary states, i.e.,{X ∈ X : VF[X] = O}. By Theorem 8, this implies that the set of stationary
states is globally attracting; a local maximum (local strict maximum, resp.) of f is Lyapunov stable
(asymptotically stable, resp.).
ii) a) Suppose that the corresponding isolated stationary strategy distribution X∗ is asymptoti-
cally stable, with a basin of attraction X 0 ⊂ X∗. Take an arbitrary joint strategy distribution X0
fromX 0 and let {Xt}t∈R+ be a solution trajectory under the heterogeneous dynamic from X0. Since
f is a strictly increasing Lyapunov function, it must be the case that f˙ (Xt) > 0 as long as Xt has
not reached exactly X∗. Thus, f (X∗) = f (X0) +
∫ ∞
0 f˙ (Xt)dt > f (X0). Since X0 is taken arbitrarily
from X 0, this verifies that X∗ strictly maximizes f in this neighborhood X 0.
b) We prove the claim by contradiction. Assume that, while X∗ is Lyapunov stable, X∗ is not
a local maximum of f . Take an open neighborhood X˜ ∗ of X∗ such that cl X˜ ∗ ⊂ X∗. Let X 1 :=
f−1(( f (X∗)− h, f (X∗) + h)) ∩ X˜ ∗ with an arbitrarily fixed h > 0; since f is continuous, X 1 is an
open neighborhood of X∗. By Lyapunov stability of X∗, there exists another open neighborhood
X 0 ⊂ X 1 of X∗ such that any solution trajectory starting from X 0 stays in X 1 at any moment of
time. As X∗ is not a local maximum, there exists another strategy distribution X† ∈ X 0 such that
f (X†) > f (X∗); note that f (X†) < f (X∗) + h since X† ∈ X 0 ⊂ X 1.
Let X¯ 2 = f−1([ f (X∗) − h, f (X∗) + h]) ∩ cl X˜ ∗; X 1 ⊂ X¯ 2 and this is closed in X and thus
compact, as X is compact. Consider a solution trajectory {Xt}t∈R+ starting from X†; it stays in X 1
and thus in X¯ 2. By PC, f (Xt) is weakly increasing in t and thus f (Xt) ≥ f (X0) = f (X†) > f (X∗).
As X∗ is the only stationary point in X∗ ⊃ X¯ 2, this implies that the trajectory {Xt} does not arrive
at or even converge to a stationary point; thus, PC further implies f (Xt) strictly increases in t. Since
f (Xt) ∈ [ f (X†), f (X∗) + h]] (the upper bound obtained by Xt ∈ X¯ 2) for all t, f (Xt) must converge
to some finite value f¯ ∈ [ f (X†), f (X∗) + h]. The value of the potential f (Xt) is expressed as
f (Xt) =
∫ t
0
f˙ (Xt)dt =
∫ t
0
γ(Xt)dt
with γ(X) = 〈F[X], VF[X]〉.
Define γ˜ : R+ → R by γ˜(t) = γ(Xt). As γ(X) is continuous in X and Xt is continuous in
t, γ(Xt) is continuous in t. With the convergence of f (Xt) =
∫ t
0 γ˜(τ)dτ, this implies there exists
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a sequence {tn}n∈N such that tn → ∞ and γ˜(tn) → 0.55 As {Xtn}n∈N is contained in compact
set X¯ 2, there further exists a subsequence {t′m}m′∈N ⊂ {tn}n∈N such that Xt′m converges to some
X∞ ∈ X¯ 2 ⊂ X∗ as m → ∞. Since γ˜(t′m) → 0 and γ is continuous, we have γ(X∞) = 0, which
implies by PC of v that X∞ ∈ X∗ is a stationary point. Since X∗ is the only stationary point in
X∗, this limit point X∞ must be X∗. However, as f (Xt′m) → f¯ and f is also continuous, we have
f (X∞) = f¯ > f (X∗) and thus X∞ 6= X∗, a contradiction.
55Consider continuous function g : R+ → R+ that always takes a non-negative value. Improper integral
∫ ∞
0 g(τ)dτ
is well-defined (i.e., converges to a finite real number) if and only if, for any ε > 0, there exists T ≥ 0 such that
| ∫ t′t g(τ)dτ| < ε for any t′ > t > T; fix T to the one that satisfies this for ε = 1. Define a sequence {tn}n∈N by
letting tn be the moment of time to attain the minimum value of g in close interval of time [T + 2n + 1, T + 2n+1],
i.e., g(tn) = minτ∈[T+2n+1,T+2n+1] g(τ); this minimum exists and tn → ∞, since g is continuous and we have tn ≤
T + 2n+1 ≤ T + 2n+1 + 1 ≤ tn+1. For each n ∈ N, this tn satisfies 0 ≤ (2n+1 − 2n − 1)g(tn) ≤
∫ T+2n+1
T+2n+1 g(τ)dτ =
| ∫ T+2n+1T+2n+1 g(τ)dτ| < 1; hence, 0 ≤ g(tn) ≤ 1/(2n+1 − 2n − 1) = 1/(2n − 1). This implies g(tn) → 0 as n → 0 and thus
tn → ∞.
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